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In conclusion it should be emphasized again that not too much should be claimed for this scheme. The OPTICA proposal recognizes the unfortunate fact that inflationary propensities differ among member countries. It emphasizes the predominantly nominal character of divergent inflation rates and it allows exchange rates to offset (no more than) differences in inflation trends. It therefore underlines the importance of real factors for the processes of integration and economic growth in the Community. Contrary to earlier approaches to monetary integration the proposal is not trying to fix and support nominal exchange rates. Rather it aims at stabilizing real exchange rates within certain margins. The approach may therefore be labelled as the model of a "real" snake -as distinguished from the traditional "nominal" snake mechanism. Recognition of the fact that inflation rates differ is both the strength and the weakness of the scheme. It constitutes its weakness, because it means that the scheme by itself cannot contribute in a major way to the harmonization of inflation rates at a low level. The prerequisite for this is, in fact, a close coordination of the member countries' monetary (and incomes) policies. It constitutes its strength, because -contrary to the snake arrangement -the OPTICA scheme cannot be endangered by a persistent divergence between member countries' monetary and incomes policies and the resultant variation of inflation rates.
Managing Floating Exchange Rates
Benjamin J. Cohen, Medford/USA * T here is much to praise in the OPTICA proposal for a new exchange-rate agreement for the European Community. The authors are clearly well informed about the recent behavior of foreign-exchange markets, as well as about recent developments in exchange-rate theory, and their case for improving management of exchange markets is a strong one. 1 am in full accord with their general approach to the problem. But there is also much to which one might take exception in their proposal, at least as it is presently formulated. I am in less accord with some of its most crucial details. In my view, an effective system of exchange management must, first of all, be supple -capable of bending before the wind like a willow, not rigid and inflexible like an oak. The OPTICA proposal, I fear, is more an oak than a willow and could easily break if the winds in the exchange markets happen to blow strongly enough.
Anarchy Instead of the Rule of Law
What is the case for improving management of exchange markets? Essentially, it is the case for replacing anarchy with the rule of law. At the moment, no effective rule of law prevails with respect to exchange rates -neither within the European Community nor in the wider international context. Governments everywhere are pres-* Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University. ently free to follow virtually any exchange-rate policy they choose. No agreed principles exist to specify which instruments of national policy may be used to influence exchange rates or which targets of national policy may be regarded as legitimate. Consequently, no certainty exists that policy instruments will be employed, or targets established, in ways that are mutually consistent. If the policies of governments are mutually inconsistent, it is hardly likely that their exchange rates will remain stable for long.
Whatever its defects, the old Bretton Woods system of "adjustable pegs" had one outstanding virtue: it established the rule of law with respect to exchange rates. Governments accepted an obligation to maintain exchange rates within specified margins around a declared par value. After the struggle to preserve the old system ended in early 1973, and the rates of major currencies began to float without limit, nations technically were living in sin. The main accomplishment of the Second Amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement, agreed at a special Fund meeting in Jamaica in January 1976, was to remove the stigma of sin, by legalizing floating.
Unfortunately, not much else was accomplished on exchange rates. The Second Amendment mentions nothing specific about norms or conventions to guide central-bank intervention in exchange markets, nor about what should be the respective adjustment obligations of surplus and deficit countries. It does suggest that governments should "avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members". But it contains no effective mechanism to ensure that such "dirty floating" will in fact be avoided. Indeed, it does not even define what "manipulation" or "unfair competitive advantage" are supposed to mean, let alone suggest any rules by which they might be curbed or prevented. The leeway for discretionary behavior by governments remains very wide, as the OPTICA authors note. Consequently, the risk of inconsistency among national policies or of competitive exchange-rate manipulations by individual governments remains very high. That in turn tends to foster uncertainty and destabilizing expectations in exchange markets.
This does not mean, however, that we should go back to formal pegging of exchange rates. It is true that pegging offers the advantage of a relatively fixed point of reference for international .economic transactions, while in principle the necessary flexibility can be assured by periodic adjustment of the peg. But in practice this flexibility is not likely to be used sufficiently because of the political overtones of such overt policy moves. Delays are inevitable in a policy context where a positive decision to change is required. Political pressures from domestic and foreign actors whose special interests are threatened by an exchange-rate change naturally favor procrastination on the part of decision-makers; and this tendency towards bureaucratic inertia is reinforced as well by delays as the necessary evidence for a change is accumulated. In a world of extensive capital mobility, this constitutes an open invitation to speculate against parities -a "one-way option" to bet against the ability of governments to maintain declared par values. With formal pegging, there is always a risk that governments will drift back toward defending fundamentally inappropriate currency prices. Under the Bretton Woods system, the emphasis was always on the "peg" rather than on the "adjustable".
Minimal "Code of Good Conduct"
The challenge, then, is not to abandon floating exchange rates but, rather, to manage them better -that is, to reduce the degree of uncertainty in exchange markets so as to promote stabilizing rather than destabilizing expectations. To accomplish this, it is necessary to reduce the risk of inconsistency among national policies or of competitive exchange-rate manipulations. And this means restricting the leeway for discretionary behavior by governments, by instituting at least a minimal "code of good conduct" to influence national policy choices affecting exchange rates. Ideally, such a code should establish a "reference rate" within agreed margins for each country as a guide for central-bank intervention in exchange markets. This is precisely what the OPTICA proposal attempts to do for each member of the European Community. As formulated, however, the proposal would not necessarily provide the most effective basis for managing exchange rates in the Community. In this brief space, I shall focus my remarks on just two features of the proposal that are among the most crucial to its operation -the procedure for setting and revising reference rates and the intervention rule.
Greater Disequilibrium
The procedure for setting and revising reference rates is based on each participating country's relative price performance. A purchasing-powerparity (PPP) index would be calculated for each country by dividing its wholesale price index by a weighted average of the wholesale price indices of its competitors. Its reference rate would then be changed periodically in proportion to changes in the moving average of its PPP index.
The rationale for this procedure is that in the long term it is relative price performance that dominates in the determination of exchange rates. On this point I have no quarrel with the OPTICA authors. The validity of the PPP relationship as a secular phenomenon is well established empirically; elsewhere in their Report the authors themselves produce convincing evidence of the tendency for exchange rates, over longer periods of time, to move in conformity with national inflation differentials. Relative price performance can hardly be ignored in the procedure for setting and revising reference rates.
But is relative price performance on its own a sufficient basis for that procedure? I would argue that it is not -that, indeed, exclusive reliance on a PPP index might actually be destabilizing rather than stabilizing in its economic impacts. The PPP relationship is valid only as a secular phenomenon. The shorter the time period under consideration, the weaker are the links between exchange-rate movements and inflation differentials. Relative price performance counts for less; conditions of equilibrium in asset markets count for more. In the short term, the exchange rate is simply one of the prices that equilibrates international markets for financial assets (including money) and is determined simultaneously with yields on domestic and foreign assets so as to maintain overall balance in the portfolios of wealth holders. What might constitute genuine
